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LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS IN US - ROC TRADE SINCE
DERECOGNITION
By DAVID L. SIMON*
This article sets forth the principal legal developments affecting trade
between the United States and the Republic of China (Taiwan) between
January 1, 1979 and October 31, 1982. This period was marked by the
American withdrawal of diplomatic recognition as to the Republic of China
on January 1, 1979 and the subsequent passage of the Taiwan Relations
Act, as well as by the adoption of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 im-
plementing the Multilateral Trade Negotiations. During this period, U.S.
trade with Taiwan continued to flourish; indeed, neither derecognition nor
the restructuring of much of U.S. trade law appears to have materially af-
fected US-ROC trade.
This article begins with a discussion of the Taiwan Relations Act and
the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 insofar as they relate specifically to US-
ROC trade. Next, an overview of US-Taiwan trade relations is presented.
Then the principal trade cases are discussed and the results for US-ROC
trade are analyzed. In a final section, pending matters of concern to US-
ROC trade are set forth.
I. THE STATUTES
A. The Taiwan Relations Act
The Taiwan Relations Act' was signed into law on April 10, 1979; it
provides the statutory basis for continued relations between the United
States and Taiwan, following President Carter's withdrawal of diplomatic
recognition from the Republic of China effective January 1, 1979.
In Section 2, entitled "Findings and Declaration of Policy," the TRA
states that it is the policy of the United States to "preserve and promote
extensive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural and other relations be-
tween the people of the United States and the people of Taiwan,"' and to
"consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peace-
ful means, including by boycotts and embargoes, a threat to the peace and
security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United
* Attorney-at-law, Washington, D.C.
1. 22 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3316 (Supp. V 1981) [hereinafter referred to as TRA]. For text
and legislative history, see LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT: AN ANA-
LYTIC COMPILATION (L. Wolff and D. Simon eds. 1982).
2. 22 U.S.C. §3301(b)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
(203)
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States." s It is therefore American policy to continue to promote US-Taiwan
trade relations, with the express understanding that any attempt by the
People's Republic of China (PRC) to interfere with Taiwan's commerce,
anywhere in the world, by boycott or embargo, would not be countenanced.
Section 4 of the TRA provides that all U.S. laws shall apply to Taiwan
as they did before derecognition.4 It also approves the continuation in force
3. 22 U.S.C. §3301(b)(4) (Supp. V 1981) (emphasis added).
4. The provisions ensuring continued application of U.S. laws and international agree-
ments to Taiwan are most comprehensive, to wit:
(a) The absence of diplomatic relations or recognition shall not affect the application
of the laws of the United States with respect to Taiwan, and the laws of the United
States shall apply with respect to Taiwan in the manner that the laws of the United
States applied with respect to Taiwan prior to January 1, 1979.
(b) The application of subsection (a) of this section shall include, but shall not be
limited to, the following:
(1) Whenever the laws of the United States refer or relate to foreign countries,
nations, states, governments, or similar entities, such terms shall include and such
laws shall apply with respect to Taiwan,
(2) Whenever authorized by or pursuant to the laws of the United States to conduct
or carry on programs, transactions, or other relations with respect to foreign coun-
tries, nations, states, governments, or similar entities, the President or any agency of
the United States Government is authorized to conduct and carry out, in accordance
with section 6 of this Act, such programs, transactions, and other relations with
respect to Taiwan (including, but not limited to, the performance of services for the
United States through contracts with commercial entities on Taiwan), in accordance
with the applicable laws of the United States.
(3)(A) The absence of diplomatic relations and recognition with respect to Taiwan
shall not abrogate, infringe, modify, deny, or otherwise affect in any way any rights
or obligations (including but not limited to those involving contracts, debts, or prop-
erty interests of any kind) under the laws of the United States heretofore or hereaf-
ter acquired by or with respect to Taiwan.
(B) For all purposes under the laws of the United States, including actions in
any court in the United States, recognition of the People's Republic of China shall
not affect in any way the ownership of or other rights or interests in properties,
tangible and intangible, and other things of value, owned or held on or prior to
December 31, 1978, or thereafter acquired or earned by the governing authorities
on Taiwan.
(7) The capacity of Taiwan to sue and be sued in courts in the United States, in
accordance with the laws of the United States, shall not be abrogated, infringed,
modified, denied, or otherwise affected in any way by the absence of diplomatic
relations or recognition.
(8) No requirement, whether expressed or implied, under the laws of the United
States with respect to maintenance of diplomatic relations or recognition shall be
applicable with respect to Taiwan.
(c) For all purposes, including actions in any court in the United States, the Con-
gress approves the continuation in force of all treaties and other international agreements,
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of all treaties and multilateral agreements to which the United States and
Taiwan are both signatories5 and further states that, "Nothing in this Act
may be construed as a basis for supporting the exclusion or expulsion of
Taiwan from continued membership in any international financial institu-
tion or any other international organization."
Section 5 of the TRA ensures for Taiwan the continued availability of
coverage by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC)7 for "in-
surance, reinsurance, loans, or guarantees with respect to investment
projects on Taiwan."8
Thus Sections 4 and 5 constitute the legal basis to ensure that trade
and investment with Taiwan shall not be adversely affected by the sever-
ance of diplomatic ties.
Sections 6 through 11 of the TRA provide the organizational basis for
relations between the United States and Taiwan,' namely, the American
Institute in Taiwan (AIT)I0 and the Coordination Council for North Amer-
ican Affairs (CCNAA)."
Thus the Taiwan Relations Act provides a comprehensive legal and
institutional format under which US-Taiwan trade should be able to main-
tain the growth it experienced prior to derecognition.
B. The Trade Agreements Act of 1979
The Trade Agreements Act of 197913 implements in the United States
the results of the Tokyo Round of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations
(MTN). The principal titles of TAA 79 applicable now or in the future to
US-Taiwan trade are as follows:
including multilateral conventions, entered into by the United States and the governing
authorities on Taiwan recognized by the United States as the Republic of China prior to
January 1, 1979, and in force between them on December 31, 1978, unless and until
terminated in accordance with law.
22 U.S.C. §3303 (Supp. V 1981).
5. Id.
6. 22 U.S.C. §3303(d) (Supp. V 1981).
7. 22 U.S.C. §3304 (Supp. V. 1981) removes the OPIC per capita income restriction as
to the Taiwan for a three-year period ending April 10, 1982. However, OPIC coverage re-
mains available by virtue of the increase in the OPIC per capita income restriction to $2,950
in 1979 dollars. 22 U.S.C. §2191 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
8. 22 U.S.C. §3304(a) (Supp. V 1981).
9. 22 U.S.C. §§3305-3310 (Supp. V 1981).
10. 22 U.S.C. §3305 (Supp. V 1981).
11. 22 U.S.C. §3309 (Supp. V 1981).
12. 19 U.S.C. §§2501-2582 (Supp. V 1981) [hereinafter referred to as TAA 79].
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-Title I: Antidumping and Countervailing Duties. These provisions,
inter alia, apply an injury test for dutiable imports under a counter-
vailing duties (CVD) investigation; provide strict time limits for both
antidumping and CVD cases; provide for the exchange between the
parties, under protective order, of confidential information; provide for
increased judicial review; require the collection of estimated duties
upon entry for goods imported after the suspension of liquidation; and
provide for annual review of dumping and CVD cases."
-Title II: Customs Valuation.' 4 This title replaces prior methods of
valuation, including American Selling Price and Final List, with a hier-
archy of five valuation methods.
-Title III: Government Procurement.'5 This title requires signatory
countries to apply uniform and open procedures to purchases by cov-
ered national agencies. Signatories of the Agreement on Government
Procurement (AGP) shall be able to bid on government procurements
opened for bid by covered national agencies. Taiwan is not at present
an AGP signatory.
-Title IV: Product Standards.' s This title implements the Agreement
on Technical Barriers to Trade; its purpose is to discourage discrimina-
tory manipulations of product standards, testing, and certification
systems.
-Title V: Implementation of Tariff Negotiations. This title implements
the tariff concessions negotiated during the Tokyo Round. Taiwan has
entered into an agreement with the United States under which it re-
ceives the Tokyo Round tariff concession in exchange for certain con-
cessions of its own.1 7
Titles VI, VII, and VIII of TAA 79 relate to civil aircraft, agriculture
measures, and treatment of distilled spirits, respectively. Title IX revises
section 301 of the Trade Act of 197418 providing for presidential retaliation
13. Taiwan is a "country under the agreement" for purposes of entitlement to an injury
determination in a CVD investigation of dutiable goods. Office of the STR, Determination
Regarding Application of Certain International Trade Agreements, 45 Fed. Reg. 1181 (1980).
14. 19 U.S.C. §1401(a) (Supp. V 1981). The Customs Valuation Code was implemented
in the United States by Pres. Proc. 4768 (June 28, 1980), 45 Fed. Reg. 45135 (1980).
15. Notices relating to the Customs Valuation, Government Procurement, and other
MTN Codes are found at 44 Fed. Reg. 74784 (1979), 45 Fed. Reg. 1181 (1980), 45 Fed. Reg.
18547 (1980), 45 Fed. Reg. 36569 (1980), 46 Fed. Reg. 24059 (1981).
16. See note 15, supra.
17. Agreement on Multilateral Trade Negotiation Matters (October 24, 1979), reprinted
at I CHINESE YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND AFFAIRS 196 (1981).
18. 19 U.S.C. §§2411-16 (Supp. V 1981).
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and relief against foreign unfair actions and enforcement of U.S. rights
under the MTN agreements."' Title X of TAA 79 provides increased op-
portunity for judicial review, particularly in antidumping and counter-
vailing duties cases. Finally, Title XI incorporates miscellaneous changes,
including extension of the presidential negotiating authority, authorization
of the auctioning of import licenses in certain cases, and the establishment
of civil penalties (fines) in section 337 cases for violation of a cease and
desist order.
For the present, TAA 79 is expected to have its greatest impact on
US-Taiwan commercial relations by virtue of the tariff concessions and the
revisions in antidumping and countervailing duties laws. It does not'appear
that Taiwan is prepared to sign the product standards and other agreements
the applicability of which depends upon multilateral or bilateral
agreements.
II. OVERVIEW OF US-ROC TRADE RELATIONS
U.S. trade with Taiwan does not appear to have been affected by the
withdrawal of U.S. diplomatic recognition. While its strong dependence on
external trade2" renders Taiwan especially vulnerable to international eco-
nomic downturns, the country has succeeded in maintaining its strong and
growing economic ties throughout the world.
The United States remains Taiwan's biggest trading partner, buying
over 36% of Taiwan's exports ($8.163 out of $22.611 billion in 1981)"' and
supplying 22.4% of Taiwan's imports ($4.766 out of $21.200 billion in
1981).2 In the first six months of 1982, the U.S. share of both exports from
Taiwan and imports to Taiwan increased to 39.1% and 24.5%, respec-
tively. 8 In 1981, two-way U.S.-Taiwan trade was $12.9 billion, out of
19. For a discussion of two significant section 301 cases, see Echols, Section 301: Access
to Foreign Markets from an Agricultural Perspective. 6 INT'L TRADE L.J. 4 (1980-81); Stoler,
The Border Broadcasting Dispute: A Unique Case Under Section 301, 6 INT'L TRADE L.J. 39
(1980-81).
20. Taiwan's total external trade for 1981 amounted to $43.8 billion, or 94.8% of Tai-
wan's $46.2 billion GNP. Exports of $22.6 billion accounted for 48.9% of the GNP. U.S.
Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, Foreign Economic Trends and
their Implications for the United States-Taiwan (June 1982) (preliminary draft) [hereinafter,
FET 6182]. Other U.S. government-generated data and analyses are available in the annual
papers entitled "Trade Outlook for Taiwan," available from the American Institute in Taiwan
[hereinafter cited as AIT Outlook].
21. FET 6/82, supra note 20.
22. Id. See also AIT Outlook 1982, supra note 20.
23. AIT Outlook 1982, supra note 20, at 2.
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which Taiwan had a record surplus of $3.4 billion." In the first five months
of 1982, Taiwan's exports to the United States increased by over 17%, in
spite of the U.S. recession.as For all of 1982, U.S.-Taiwan trade is expected
to grow by 12.4% over 1981, to $14.5 billion, with Taiwan having a $3.5
billion surplus." Thus, Taiwan is likely to remain the United States' eighth
largest trading partner . 7
Nevertheless, the economic picture is not unblemished. Taiwan's 1981
real GNP grew at a rate of 5.5%, down sharply from the average of 9% per
year over the last 30 years.' 8 Growth in the first quarter of 1982 was even
lower, at 3.5%."0 These figures are balanced by Taiwan's low inflation rate
of 2.5% in 1981 as measured by the wholesale price index30 and by its ap-
proximately 1.4% unemployment rate.' 1 Taiwan's 1981 inflation rate is es-
pecially significant in view of its 19.9% wholesale price index inflation rate
for 1980.3"
Taiwan's capital inflow outlook remains quite good. In 1981, the coun-
try had a capital inflow of $839 million,as down from $1.2 billion in 1980."
The decrease in capital inflow appears to be the result of the decision to
delay certain infrastructure programs as a result of Taiwan's 1981 budget
deficit." The availability of foreign funds, including U.S. Eximbank loans,
for Taiwan remains strong, in spite of Taiwan's having lost its membership
in the IMF and the World Bank." Some 45% of Taiwan's external funds
came from U.S. Eximbank and commercial loans.' 7
In summary, Taiwan's economy seems to have ignored the loss of U.S.
diplomatic relations and the passage of the Taiwan Relations Act. While
Taiwan's economy has had its difficulties-all relatively minor compared to
those of other countries, both industrialized and developing-those
problems have been linked to global economic movements rather than to
24. FET 6/82, supra note 20, at 3.
25. Id. But see AIT Outlook 1982, supra note 20, at 2, giving a figure of 15.8%.
26. FET 6/82, supra note 20, at 3.
27. Id.
28. AIT Outlook 1982, supra note 20, at 1.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. FET 6/82, supra note 20, at 11.
33. Id. at 12.
34. U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, Foreign Eco-
nomic Trends and their Implications for the United States-Taiwan. FET 81-095 at 12 (Au-
gust 1981) [hereinafter, FET 6/81].
35. FET 6/82, supra note 20, at 12.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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Taiwan's particular diplomatic status.
III. CASES INVOLVING U.S.-TAIWAN TRADE
This section reports on particular U.S. cases involving products im-
ported in significant quantity from Taiwan." It is divided into subsections
corresponding to the relevant statutes.
A. Escape Clause Cases
The escape clause provisions of the Trade Act of 197489 allow the Pres-
ident to provide import relief for up to five years, in the form of a tariff
increase or quantitative restriction, when increased imports are the substan-
tial cause of serious injury to a domestic industry producing like or directly
competitive articles, in order to facilitate an orderly adjustment to import
competition. Although there was pressure during the Tokyo Round MTN
to allow for selective safeguards which would affect only the chief suppliers
of an article, the law currently requires that import relief be imposed on a
nondiscriminatory basis. However, the President may negotiate orderly
marketing agreements (OMAs) with individual countries to restrict imports
selectively.
Procedurally, escape clause actions are instituted by the International
Trade Commission, usually following receipt of a petition therefor by the
affected domestic industry. The Commission is required to report its recom-
mendations to the President within six months from the time a petition is
received. If the Commission finds that the statutory elements for import
relief are lacking, the investigation is terminated and the President may not
provide import relief under the escape clause. If, on the other hand, the
Commission finds that the domestic industry has suffered serious injury
substantially caused by increased imports, it recommends the type and
quantum of relief which it finds necessary to enable the industry to adjust
to import competition. Thereafter, the President has 60 days within which
to determine the type and quantum of relief, if any, that will be granted. If
the President's decision is different from the ITC's recommendation, the
Congress may by joint resolution disapprove the President's determination
within 90 legislative days after the President's determination; in such a
38. For a more detailed treatment of cases between January 1, 1979 and June 15, 1981,
see D. Simon, Legal Developments in US-ROC Trade from January 1, 1979 through June 15.
1981, 1 CHINESE YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND AFFAIRS 97 (1981) [hereinafter,
"Simon, Legal Developments"].
39. 19 U.S.C. §§2251-2298 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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case, the relief recommended by the ITC will be implemented."0 '
Thus the escape clause is a fair-trade statute providing relief when in-
creased imports substantially cause serious injury; there is no requirement
that an unfair practice be alleged.
The escape clause enjoyed a vogue during the period March 1976-De-
cember 1980, when the ITC handed down decisions in no fewer than 34
escape clause cases.' However, since the December 1980 negative determi-
nation in the automobile case,'41 the ITC has heard only two escape clause
investigations.' This is surprising in light of the tendency for trade cases to
increase during a recession, but may be explained by such factors as the
uncertainty of receiving meaningful relief even if the ITC finds in the af-
firmative, the perceived difficulty in obtaining an affirmative ITC recom-
mendation, the increasing cost of such investigations, and the large amount
of discretion vested in the President under the escape clause.
Mushrooms.48 Effective November 1, 1980, the President imposed a
three-year duty increase on imported canned mushrooms as follows: year 1,
20% ad val.; year 2, 15% ad val.; year 3, 10% ad val." These increases are
superimposed on the column 1 rates.45 The import relief will expire on Oc-
tober 31, 1983,"4 unless extended via the escape clause review procedures.4
7
The mushroom case is especially significant for Taiwan because of the
strong involvement of the PRC in the trade, as set forth below.4
8
In its escape clause report, the ITC recommended that the President
implement a quota on mushroom imports for three years, to be allocated by
country as the President deemed appropriate." The Commission's quota
39.1. The Constitutionality of the legislative veto (and, indeed, the entire Escape Clause)
is questionable in light of Chadha v. INS, 51 U.S.L.W. 4907 (U.S. June 21, 1983), affirming
634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980).
40. From Mushrooms, USITC Investigation No. TA-201-10, USITC Pub. No. 761
(March 1976) through Certain Motor Vehicles, USITC Investigation No. TA-201-44, USITC
Pub. No. 1110 (December 1980).
41. Id.
42. Fishing Rods, USITC Investigation No. TA-201-45, USITC Pub. No. 1194 (Novem-
ber 1981) (negative determination); Tubeless Tire Valves, USITC Investigation No. TA-201-
46, USITC Pub. No. 1286 (September 1982) (negative determination).
43. Mushrooms, USITC Investigation No. TA-201-43, USITC Pub. No. 1089 (August
1980).
44. Pres. Proc. 4801 (October 29, 1980), 45 Fed. Reg. 72617 (1980).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. 19 U.S.C. §2253(i) (1976).
48. See also Simon, Legal Developments, supra note 38, at 107-111.
49. Mushrooms, supra note 43, at 1-2.
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recommendation was predicated on the finding that-
It is possible that [Taiwan and Korea] would absorb at least part of
any given tariff to maintain their existing share of the U.S. market.
There is also a possibility that [the PRC] might absorb any tariff in-
creases in order to increase its small but growing market share."
The Commission, however, avoided the difficult problem of how to allocate
imports between Taiwan, Korea and the PRC51 by recommending that the
President set the allocation. The President, in turn, avoided the allocation
problem by imposing a tariff increase instead.5
The Commission's statement, quoted above, was prescient, at least as
to the PRC. Since the imposition of relief, the PRC has captured a major
share of the U.S. mushroom import market. Between 1979 and 1981, Tai-
wan's exports of mushrooms to the United States fell from 50.8 million to
24.6 million pounds, while the PRC's increased from 265 thousand to 27.4
million pounds. In 1980, the PRC directly accounted for 12.6% of U.S.
imports; in 1981, that figure increased to 30.96%." For the second half of
1981, the PRC accounted for 38.0% of total U.S. imports." Moreover,
PRC prices have declined, apparently to offset the tariff increase and in-
crease market share: in 1980, the average PRC unit value was $0.91 per
pound; in 1981, it decreased to $0.84, with a further decline to $0.79 in the
second half of 1981.55
The ability of the PRC to increase market share and quantity has un-
dermined the effectiveness of the import relief, leading in turn to efforts to
further restrict PRC mushrooms. In July 1982 the domestic industry filed a
petition at the ITC under section 406 of the Trade Act of 1974" alleging
that mushroom imports from the PRC were causing market disruption with
the United States.57 The ITC decision was evenly divided (by 2-2 vote) on
50. Id. at 24.
51. 19 U.S.C. §2253(d)(2) (1976)requires that a quota permit imports at not less than
the level of the most recent "representative" period. However, before it received MFN status,
effective February 1, 1980 (45 Fed. Reg. 6882 (1980)), the PRC had been effectively excluded
from the U.S. market by virtue of the high column 2 duty rate on canned mushrooms (10
cents per lb. v. 3.2 cents per lb. for column 1). Therefore, it could be - and was - argued
that there was no "representative" period for PRC imports.
52. Note 44, supra.
53. Certain Mushrooms, USITC Investigation No. TA-203-13, USITC Pub. No. 1239 at
A-60, 61 (April 1982).
54. Id. at A-61.
55. Id.
56. 19 U.S.C. §2436 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
57. Notice of Investigation at 47 Fed. Reg. 31631 (July 21, 1982).
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the question of the existence of market disruption."8 Consequently, the U.S.
Trade Representative (USTR) solicited comments on the advisability of
relief."9
In addition, on October 18, 1982 a different faction of the domestic
industry filed an antidumping petition with respect to mushrooms from the
PRC, Hong Kong and Macao. s° As of this writing, no action has been
taken in this petition. It is of interest that the petition suggests that the
Department of Commerce choose Taiwan as the "surrogate" country for
the PRC for purposes of a cost-of-production analysis; however, it remains
to be seen whether the action will be instituted and whether the Taiwan
industry will consent to being so used.
Other recent mushroom actions include the following. In September
1981 the ITC recommended that the President remove the duty increase for
certain exotic mushrooms;e1 thereafter, the President so lifted the import
relief." In a different investigation, the ITC found that termination of relief
as to mushrooms broiled in butter would have an adverse economic effect
on the domestic industry."3 Subsequently, the USTR reviewed the ITC's
advice, but no changes in the relief were made."
In summary, the President's choice of a tariff increase as import relief
in the mushroom escape clause investigation has enabled the PRC to make
tremendous inroads into the U.S. market, to the detriment of both Taiwan
and the domestic industry.
Non-electric cookware."5 On January 11, 1980, President Carter im-
posed a tariff increase on certain porcelain-on-steel cookingware (except
teakettles)." The amount of relief given was 20 cents per pound for each of
58. Canned Mushrooms from the PRC USITC Investigation No. TA-406-9 (unpub-
lished at the time of this writing).
59. 47 Fed. Reg. 44652 (October 8, 1982). The case is pending at the time of this
writing.
60. Petition dated October 13, 1982, filed on behalf of the Four "H" Corporation.
61. Certain Mushrooms, USITC Investigation No. TA-203-9, USITC Pub. 1184 (Sep-
tember 1981). Specifically, the ITC, under the statutory mandate of section 203 of the Trade
Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §2253(i)(2) (1976), advised that exclusion of certain listed mushrooms
from import relief "will not have an adverse economic effect on the domestic industry." Id. at
1.
62. Pres. Proc. 4904, February 27, 1982, 47 Fed. Reg. 8753 (1982).
63. Certain Mushrooms, USITC Investigation No. TA-203-13, USITC Pub. No. 1239
(April 1982).
64. USTR Request for Comment was published at 47 Fed. Reg. 20060 (1982).
65. Non-electric Cookware, USITC Investigation No. TA-201-39, USITC Pub. No. 1008
(November 1979). For further details and analysis, see Simon, Legal Developments. supra
note 38, at 101-3.
66. Pres. Proc. 4713, 45 Fed. Reg. 3561 (1980).
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the first two years, 15 cents per pound for the third year, and 10 cents per
pound for the fourth year, all in addition to the column 1 rate. In the fifth
year, the duty would revert to the column I rate, currently 3.2% ad
valorem." The relief order also provided for a midpoint review after 2
years;6" that review was held, and the ITC advised the President that termi-
nation of relief would have an adverse economic effect on the domestic in-
dustry,70 and the President decided not to terminate relief.7 '
The relief implemented in this case had a significant effect on U.S.
imports of enamelware from Taiwan. From an initial level of $85,000 in
1976, U.S. imports from Taiwan increased tenfold to $808,000 in 1977,
then more than quintupled in 1978 to $4.5 million. In 1979, U.S. imports
from Taiwan were $4.7 million. 72 In 1980, imports from Taiwan of cook-
ingware subject to the relief's amounted to $1.7 million-a 64% decline.
However, total enamel cookingware imports from Taiwan, including articles
exempted from the duty increase, amounted to $3.2 million,7 for a gross
decline of 32%.75 In 1981, U.S. imports of covered enamelware from Tai-
wan 7 6 totaled $2.6 million-a decline of 44.7% from. the pre-relief peak, but
an increase of 52.9% from the preceding year. Total enamelware imports
from Taiwan in 1981 amounted to $4.8 million-approximately the same
level as the pre-relief peak.7 7
Leather Wearing Apparel.'s In this escape clause case, the ITC unani-
mously recommended the imposition of import relief; however, President
Carter decided against relief, and the industry was unable to secure a Con-
gressional veto which would have required implementation of the Commis-
sion's recommendation.
The U.S. leatherwear industry had sought import relief since at least
1976, in actions involving petitions to remove the product from the GSP
(Generalized System of Preferences) eligibility list and countervailing
67. See TSUS items 923.60, 654.02.
68. TSUS item 654.02. The LDDC rate is 2.7% ad valorem.
69. 45 Fed. Reg. 759 (1980).
70. USITC Investigation No. TA-203-10, USITC Pub. No. 1190 (1981).
71. The USTR Solicitation of Comments appeared at 46 Fed. Reg. 56099 (1981).
72. Bureau of Census statistics, FT 246.
73. I.e., enamelware other than teakettles, valued not over $2.25/lb. TSUS item
654.0224.
74. I.e., TSUS items 654.0215, 654.0224, and 654.0225.
75. Bureau of Census statistics, FT 246.
76. TSUS 654.0224.
77. Bureau of Census statistics, FT 246.
78. Leather Wearing Apparel, USITC Investigation No. TA-201-30, USITC Pub. No.
1030 (1980). For a more detailed analysis, see Simon, Legal Developments, supra note 38, at
103-7.
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duties.7"
In its escape clause report, the Commission unanimously found the in-
dustry entitled to relief and recommended a three-year duty increase begin-
ning with a 25% ad valorem surcharge for all items valued not over $150.00
each."s The President subsequently rejected the ITC recommendation and
denied relief.' 1 Finally, the domestic industry waged a strong and sharply
contested effort in Congress to obtain a legislative override, but that effort
was unsuccessful."s In his denial of relief, President Carter listed, inter alia,
three factors that may be useful for citation in subsequent cases:
1. Import relief would be inflationary.
2. Price increases would further erode consumer demand.
3. It was "not clear that the industry would be in a position to compete
once relief expires.' 8
Subsequent testimony of executive branch officials before the appropri-
ate House and Senate subcommittees indicated that the President's chief
concern as to the import relief was its effect upon his anti-inflation plan,
which had been announced fewer than 10 days prior to the President's deci-
sions denying relief." Thus the factors listed above may be of somewhat
limited use as precedent; apparently, the President's "motivation" was the
need to show a consistently united front on inflation issues.
In spite of Taiwan's success in the leatherwear case, the mere existence
of the investigation introduced significant uncertainties into the leatherwear
market and were doubtless a factor in the decline of leatherwear imports
from Taiwan from $35.6 million in 1979 to $24.6 million in 1980 in spite of
a stiff increase in hide prices."
B. Escape Clause Review Cases
Import relief provided under the escape clause is of limited duration:
the statute limits relief to an initial period of not more than five years;
thereafter, relief may be extended for an additional period of not more than
79. Id.
80. Leather Wearing Apparel, supra note 78.
81. 45 Fed. Reg. 19543 (1980).
82. 126 Cong. Rec. S.12713-17 (1980).
83. 45 Fed. Reg. 19543 (1980).
84. See Statement of Assistant U.S. Trade Representative Ann Hughes in Hearing
Before the Subcommittee on International Trade of the Committee on Finance of the U.S.
Senate. 96th Cong. 2d Se$$.. on S. Con. Res. 108 at 6 (Comm. Print 1980).
85. Bureau of Census statistics.
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three years. 86 Thus the maximum period of escape clause relief is eight
years. In effect, however, relief is rarely granted for the full initial five
years permitted by the statute, so that the eight-year maximum period is
generally not over five or six years.
Extension of relief upon the termination of the initial period is not au-
tomatic; section 203 of the statute provides that between nine and six
months prior to the expiration of the initial period, the domestic industry
may request that the Commission investigate the probable economic effects
of termination of the relief.'7 Alternatively, the President may himself re-
quest such an investigation, or the Commission may initiate sua sponte
Extension hearings and proceedings under section 203 are similar in
most respects to escape clause hearings and proceedings, with staff investi-
gations, public hearings and a published report to the President. There are
significant differences, however, in the legal effect of the ITC decision.
Under the escape clause, an affirmative ITC finding constitutes a relief rec-
ommendation to the President, given added credibility by the possibility of
a congressional veto, while a negative finding absolutely precludes the Presi-
dent from imposing import relief under the escape clause. In extension pro-
ceedings, on the other hand, the Commission's decision-whether affirma-
tive or negative-is wholly recommendatory, and there is no provision for
Congressional veto. In fact, in section 203 extension cases the Commission
is not required to propose a particular level of relief; rather, it informs the
President as to the probable economic effect if relief is terminated, but need
not propose a particular level if further relief is recommended.
Under section 203, furthermore, the level of extension relief may not
exceed the relief in effect on the last day prior to the extension. 89 Also, the
act calls for a phasing down of relief over the relief period:
To the extent feasible, any import relief provided pursuant to this sec-
tion for a period of more than 3 years shall be phased down during the
period of such relief, with the first reduction of relief taking effect no
later than the close of the day which is 3 years after the day on which
such relief first took effect."0
86. 19 U.S.C. §2253(h) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
87. 19 U.S.C. §2253(i) (1976).
88. Id.
89. 19 U.S.C. §2253(h) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
90. Id.
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Footwear." The Orderly Market Agreements (OMAs) in effect be-
tween the United States and both Taiwan and Korea from June 1977 were
allowed to expire on June 30, 1981, when President Reagan declined to
negotiate further relief." In spite of the lifting of the OMA, however, Tai-
wan's 1981 footwear output suffered considerable declines of 21.4% for
leather shoes, 7.3% for rubber shoes and 9.4% for plastic shoes.' 8 Footwear
exports decreased by 0.1%."
The ITC completed the escape clause investigation that led to the
OMAs in February 1977, unanimously recommending relief.' 5 In June
1977, the United States entered into OMAs with Taiwan and Korea."
The ITC review investigation was instituted on December 5, 1980 fol-
lowing receipt of a petition therefor on October 23, 1980. A public hearing
was held on March 9-10, and the Commission's report was transmitted to
the President on April 22, 1981. The Commission unanimously advised that
termination of the Taiwan OMA would have a significant adverse economic
impact on the domestic industry and recommended the extension of that
relief for two years at then-current levels on all categories except athletic
footwear. Three Commissioners (Alberger, Calhoun and Stern) also advised
that termination of the Korean OMA and of the restrictions on athletic
footwear from Taiwan would not have significant adverse economic effect
and therefore advised in favor of such termination." Commissioner Bedell
advised that termination of the Korean OMA or of the protection for ath-
letic footwear would have an adverse economic effect and therefore advised
such continuations.'" On June 30, 1981, President Reagan decided not to
extend the import relief on footwear, and the OMAs expired by their
terms."
The President's decision was the subject of sharp Congressional criti-
cism, predictably from representatives of shoe-producing states.'" In addi-
tion, the domestic industry filed a petition for a tariff reclassification of
certain footwear which, if granted, could have a substantial effect on Tai-
91. Nonrubber Footwear, USITC Investigation No. TA-203-7, USITC Pub. No. 1139
(April 1981).
92. See BNA, U.S. Import Weekly, No. 84, at AA-I (July 1, 1981). For a more detailed
analysis, see Simon, Legal Developments, supra note 38, at 112-15.
93. FET 6/82. supra note 20, at 6.
94. Id. at 8.
95. Footwear. USITC Investigation No. TA-201-18, USITC Pub. No. 799 (1977).
96. Nonrubber Footwear, supra note 91, at A-5. For highlights of the OMAs, see Simon,
Legal Developments, supra note 38, at 112-13.
97. Nonrubber Footwear, supra note 91, at 1-2.
98. Id. at 17ff.
99. See supra note 92.
100. Id.
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wan's exports."' Finally, in the last week of October 1982, the U.S. foot-
wear industry filed a massive section 301 petition with the Office of the
USTR alleging that the European Community, Taiwan and other countries
have imposed unfair import restrictions on U.S. shoes.10 Fifty U.S. Sena-
tors and 111 House members urged the USTR to accept and act on the
petition, which alleges that unfair trade practices abroad have caused the
diversion of world exports to the U.S. market, thereby injuring the U.S.
industry.03 The industry also announced it would institute countervailing
duty actions against Taiwan and other principal exporters within several
months. 10
Thus footwear remains a volatile issue in US-Taiwan trade.
Color Televisions.105 In March 1977, the ITC concluded an escape
clause investigation of color television receivers,'" as a result of which im-
port relief was imposed in the form of orderly marketing agreements with
Japan, Taiwan and Korea. In December 1979, the domestic color TV indus-
try requested and the Commission instituted a section 203 investigation to
advise the President as to the probable economic effects of the termination
of relief on June 30, 1980. The Commission advised the President that ter-
mination of the Japan OMA would not have an adverse effect but that
termination of the Taiwan and Korea OMA would be likely to result in
injury to U.S. producers. Thereafter, extension OMAs with Taiwan and
Korea were negotiated but that with Japan was allowed to expire. On June
30, 1982, the OMAs with Taiwan and Korea expired.10 7 The domestic in-
dustry has announced its intention to continue its activities to combat im-
ports, but to date its principal actions have been directed at the problem of
the Commerce Department's settlement of the Japanese antidumping
case.
o08
The Color Television case presents an unusual Taiwanese response to
101. Tariff Classification of Footwear-Request for Comments, 47 Fed. Reg. 3375
(1982).
102. BNA, U.S. Import Weekly, Vol. 7, p. 106 (October 27, 1982).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Color Television Receivers, USITC Investigation No. TA-203-6, USITC Pub. No.
1068 (May 1980). See also the ITC's quarterly reports on prices, orders and expenditures
(Investigation No. 332-112, USITC Pub. No. 1235 (March 1982)) and on U.S. production,
shipments, inventories, etc. (Investigation No. 332-112, USITC Pub. No. 1245 (March
1982)). For a more detailed analysis of the legal issues, see Simon, Legal Developments, supra
note 38, at 115-6.
106. Color Television Receivers. USITC Investigation No. TA-201-19, USITC Pub. No.
808 (March 1977).
107. BNA, U.S. Import Weekly, No. 135 at 423 (July 7, 1982).
108. Id. See also BNA, U.S. Import Weekly, No. 140 at 581 (August 11, 1982).
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an escape clause action. During the relief period, several of the principal
television manufacturers in Taiwan, including Tatung and Sampo, estab-
lished assembly plants in the United States,109 as did most of the major
Japanese producers."10 A similar relocation of production or assembly facili-
ties has occurred in automobiles"1 and motorcycles.1 " Whether this global
rationalization of facilities in an import-relief environment will remain via-
ble in an open market remains to be seen.
Fishing Rods.' In November 1981, the ITC made a negative deter-
mination (Commissioner Frank dissenting) in this case, finding that fishing
rods and parts thereof "are not being imported into the United States in
such increased quantities as to be a substantial cause of serious injury, or
the threat thereof, to the domestic industry."' "4 This was the second escape
clause investigation of fishing rods in recent years; the first, completed in
September 1978, also resulted in a negative determination.' 16 (This investi-
gation is considered in the Escape Clause Review Section because the ITC
had recently conducted its first fishing rods investigation; the 1981 case,
though, was not a review investigation in the strict sense.)
In the 1981 investigation, the ITC found that the U.S. industry was
not seriously injured and that increased imports were not the substantial
cause of such injury as may have been experienced."16 Specifically, the
Commission found that domestic production, shipments, sales and employ-
ment had all increased; that domestic inventories had decreased; that the
larger, more efficient domestic firms were profitable; and that the decline in
domestic capacity utilization was the result of an increase in domestic ca-
pacity.'17 Regarding causation, the Commission found that the small in-
crease in imports was inconsistent with the statutory definition of substan-
tial cause and that a shift in consumer preferences from tubular to solid
rods was a cause of injury more important than increased imports.'"
Between 1976 and 1980, Taiwan's share of the import market in fish-
ing rods increased from 40% to 50%, chiefly at the expense of Japan."19 In
109. See Color Television Receivers, supra note 105, at A-41.
110. Id. at A-16, A-17.
111. See, e.g., The Washington Post, Nov. 2, 1982 at C-8, col. 1.
112. Id.
113. Fishing Rods and Parts Thereof. USITC Investigation No. TA-201-45, USITC
Pub. No. 1194 (November 1981).
114. Id. at 1.
115. Certain Fishing Tackle, USITC Investigation No. TA-201-34, USITC Pub. No. 917
(September 1978).
116. Fishing Rods, supra note 113, at 4.
117. Id. at 7.
118. Id. at 12.
119. Id. at A-Il.
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absolute dollars, Taiwan's exports increased from $5.4 million in 1976 to
$12.6 million in 1980. In 1980, Taiwan accounted for 25.8% of the market
(imports plus domestic production) by quantity, up from 18.7% in 1976.120
C. Antidumping Cases
The antidumping law currently in effect"" was enacted as a part of the
Trade Agreements Act of 1979.1 It provides that when goods are sold in
the United States at "less than fair value" (LTFV) and when such LTFV
sales materially injure a domestic industry, then there shall be imposed on
such goods an antidumping duty equal to the LTFV margin. In general,
LTFV sales occur where the price in the home market exceeds the U.S.
price of the goods. This can occur, for example, where the home market
tariff is high relative to the U.S. tariff. Then sales behind the home market
tariff wall will tend to rise to near the prices commanded by imports in the
home market, while prices in the United States will remain relatively lower
because of the lower U.S. tariff. Such LTFV sales are subject to an an-
tidumping duty only if they injure a cognate U.S. industry. The LTFV in-
vestigation is conducted by the Department of Commerce, while a concur-
rent injury investigation is conducted by the International Trade
Commission.
Of the 83 dumping orders outstanding on March 28, 1980, three re-
lated to products from Taiwan, namely, carbon steel plate (determination
date June 13, 1979), polyvinyl chloride sheet and film (June 30, 1978), and
clear sheet glass (August 20, 1971).12 By contrast, 24 of those cases in-
volved exports from Japan.1 24
Bicycle Tires and Tubes. In January 1978, Carlisle Tire and Rubber
Co. filed an antidumping petition with respect to bicycle tires and tubes
from Taiwan." 6 That petition terminated in a negative determination. 2
The domestic industry appealed, and the Court of International Trade re-
manded with respect to two Taiwan exporters.3 7
In addition, the domestic industry filed a new antidumping action on
120. Id. at A-10, A-Il.
121. 19 U.S.C. §§1673-1673i (Supp. V 1981).
122. TAA 79, supra note 19.
123. Notice of Administrative Review, 45 Fed. Reg. 20511 (1980).
124. Id.
125. 43 Fed. Reg. 4396 (1978).
126. 43 Fed. Reg. 61066 (1978).
127. Carlisle Tire and Rubber v. United States, 3 ITRD 2074 (Slip. Op. 82-37, May 12,
1982). The affected producers were Cheng Shin and Kenda.
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April 30, 1982 as to bicycle tires and tubes from Taiwan.116 The ITC issued
a preliminary affirmative finding in June 1982,129 basing its determination
particularly on the period January-April 1982.130 Specifically, the Commis-
sion noted that the decline in Taiwan exports in 1979 through 1981 (from
11.8 million to 9.1 million units) 81 had been reversed by significant growth
in the first four months of 1982 versus the same part of 1981. These partial-
year figures showed a 41.2% increase, from 2.3 million to 3.3 million units,
together with a decline in unit price from $1.77 to $1.42.3
At the present, the investigation is continuing, and a preliminary deter-
mination from the Department of Commerce is expected shortly.
188
Carbon Steel Plate.'" This antidumping investigation was self-initi-
ated by the Department of Treasury under the Trigger Price Mechanism
(TPM) on October 25, 1978.135 The Treasury Department had determined
that steel plate from China Steel Corp. (CSC) had entered the United
States at prices below the appropriate trigger price and at prices that were
likely to be at less than fair value. CSC is Taiwan's only integrated steel
mill, a "greenfield" facility which had started full-scale commercial produc-
tion in February 1978. CSC had been "caught" by the commencement of
the TPM when it was unable to fill outstanding orders before the end of the
pre-TPM "grace period" owing to difficulties experienced in the start-up of
its plate production. 8'
In its preliminary determination, the Treasury Department found an
LTFV margin of 34% 87 The case then was referred to the ITC, where an
evenly divided (2-2) Commission decided that CSC had caused injury in
the West Coast regional market.'
As a result of the issuance of a final dumping order,1 8 CSC has with-
128. 47 Fed. Reg. 23797 (1982).
129. Bicycle Tires and Tubes from Taiwan, USITC Investigation No. 731-TA-94,
USITC Pub. No. 1258 (June 1982).
130. Id. at 8.
131. Id. at A-13.
132. Id.
133. See 47 Fed. Reg. 23797 (1982).
134. For a more detailed discussion, see Simon, Legal Developments, supra note 38, at
117-20.
135. 43 Fed. Reg. 49875 (1978).
136. Simon, Legal Developments, supra note 38, at 117-18.
137. 44 Fed. Reg. 9639 (1978).
138. Carbon Steel Plate from Taiwan, USITC Investigation No. AA1921-197, USITC
Pub. No. 970 (1979). See the analysis in Simon, Legal Developments, supra note 38, at 117-
20.
139. 44 Fed. Reg. 33877 (1979).
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drawn from the U.S. market.140 It remains to be seen whether the recent
settlement of the U.S.-EEC steel dispute 4 ' will enhance CSC's opportunity
for reentry.
Motorcycle Batteries. In March 1982, the International Trade Com-
mission made a final determination that motorcycle batteries from Taiwan
were not the cause of material injury to the domestic industry, and the
investigation was terminated. " " Previously, the Department of Commerce
had found that these products were being sold at less than fair value by
Taiwanese manufacturers, with dumping margins ranging from 1.0% to
16.8%.14 The weighted-average margin for all sales was 8%.4
The ITC decision1" reveals several interesting analyses. First, the
Commission determined that the market was divided into two segments, 6-
volt batteries and 12-volt batteries, and that the 6-volt Taiwanese batteries
were not competitive with 6-volt U.S. batteries because they were neither
interchangable nor "like."" As to the 12-volt batteries, the Commission
found that "the [domestic] industry prospered during times of greatest im-
port penetration and did less well during times of decreased imports," lead-
ing to a finding that the imports could not have been the cause of the
injury.14 7
In 1980, U.S. imports of motorcycle batteries from Taiwan amounted
to 760.5 thousand units, up 10.6% from the preceding year, with a value of
$5.26 million for 1980 and $5.25 million for 1979.148 In 1980, Taiwan had
captured 35.6% of apparent consumption. 49
Fireplace Mesh Panels. On June 7, 1982, the Department of Com-
merce published an antidumping order as to fireplace mesh panels from
Taiwan.160 A margin of 4.7% was found for all but two companies; of the
latter, one had a margin of 6.4% and the other had no margin (0%).1 The
latter firm was subjected to the order in spite of its lack of dumping "to
enable [the Commerce Department] to monitor possible diversions of
140. See 46 Fed. Reg. 48280 (1981) (final results of administrative review).
141. BNA, U.S. Import Weekly, Vol. 7, No. 4 at 99 (October 27, 1982).
142. Motorcycle Batteries From Taiwan, USITC Investigation No. 731-TA-42, USITC
Pub. No. 1228 (March 1982).
143. 47 Fed. Reg. 9264, 9268 (1982).
144. Id.
145. Motorcycle Batteries From Taiwan, supra note 142.
146. Id. at 4-5.
147. Id. at 9.
148. Id. at A-24.
149. Id. at A-8, A-24.
150. 47 Fed. Reg. 24616 (1982).
151. Id.
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merchandise."1 5 2
The International Trade Commission based its injury finding 53 on the
following factors:
1. The margin of underselling by LTFV imports was substantial: 45%
in 1978 and 29% in 198L1'" (This was cited as a "weak" indicator of
causation because of product differences.) 155
2. Market penetration by imports increased between 1979 and 1981, to
a level of 43.2% for the total market and 68% for the open (non-cap-
tive) market. 1"
3. There were significant lost sales.15 7
Therefore, even though imports had declined between 1979 and 1980,158 the
Commission found the requisite injury and causal link.
While this was not a major case in microeconomic terms-U.S. im-
ports from Taiwan in 1980 were valued at only $785,000- 59-it may be
expected that the dumping will prevent the expansion of Taiwan's U.S.
sales.
Clear Sheet Glass. Clear sheet glass from Taiwan has been subject to
a dumping order since 1971.60 The administrative review conducted in
1981 disclosed that the two exporters under the order at that time, Hsinchu
Glass Works and Taiwan Glass Corp., made no exports to the United
States between July 1, 1979 and July 31, 1980.161
The 1982 administrative review disclosed that neither Hsinchu nor
Taiwan Glass exported to the United States between August 1, 1980 and
July 31, 1981.162 However, a third firm, Yotak Trading Company, had
made sales during the relevant period. Yotak failed to respond in a timely
fashion to the International Trade Administration questionnaire, and it was
therefore assigned a margin equal to the highest known margin from Tai-
152. Final Determination of Sales.at LTFV, 47 Fed. Reg. 15393 (1982).
153. Fireplace Mesh Panels from Taiwan, USITC Investigation No. 731-TA-49, USITC
Pub. No. 1250 (May 1982).
154. Id. at 6-7.
155. Id. at 6-7, n. 15.
156. Id. at 6.
157. Id. at 7-8.
158. Id. at A-15.
159. Id. at A-13.
160. T.D. 71-226, 36 Fed. Reg. 16508 (1971).
161. Preliminary results, 46 Fed. Reg. 23278 (1981); final results, 46 Fed. Reg. 42315
(1981).
162. Preliminary results, 47 Fed. Reg. 8607 (1982); final results, 47 Fed. Reg. 42769
(1982).
LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS IN US-ROC TRADE
wan, namely 6.0%.16
D. Countervailing Duties
The countervailing duty (CVD) statute now in effect in the United
States'" was enacted as part of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979.165 It
provides that when goods produced abroad and imported into the United
States are benefited by a subsidy and a domestic industry is materially in-
jured thereby, then a countervailing duty equal to the amount of the net
subsidy shall be imposed. The predecessor statute did not contain an injury
provision except for goods imported under the Generalized System of Pref-
erences (GSP). 66 Thus CVD cases go to subsidization, while dumping
cases go to price discrimination. Taiwan is a "country under the agree-
ment" for CVD purposes and is therefore entitled to an injury investigation
in all CVD cases. 1 7
Bicycle Tires and Tubes. On February 17, 1982, the International
Trade Administration issued a CVD order as to bicycle tires and tubes
from Taiwan. 68 The order applies only to one exporter, Cheng Shin, and
sets a net rate of 0.893% ad valorem.' 9
Similarly to the bicycle tires and tubes dumping case, the CVD case
had a convoluted history. On January 8, 1979, the Secretary of Treasury' 70
issued a negative CVD determination as to bicycle tires and tubes from
Taiwan.17 1 The Secretary found that benefits had been received under three
programs-a preferential income tax ceiling, preferential export financing,
and deferred duty payments on machinery and equipment imported into
Taiwan-but that the net benefit received, 0.28% ad valorem, was de
minimis 172
Petitioner Carlisle Tire and Rubber Co. appealed, and the Court of
International Trade remanded to the International Trade Administration. 1 8
163. Id.
164. 19 U.S.C. §§1671-1671f (Supp. V 1981).
165. TAA 79, supra note 19.
166. 19 U.S.C. §1303 (1976) (prior to 1979 amendment). These provisions continue to
apply to countries that are not signatories of the MTN subsidy code or otherwise entitled to
the benefits of the new statute.
167. 46 Fed. Reg. 1181 (1980).
168. 47 Fed. Reg. 6913 (1982).
169. Id.
170. Then the administering authority for the CVD statute.
171. 44 Fed. Reg. 1815 (1979).
172. Id.
173. Carlisle Tire and Rubber Co. v. United States, 517 F. Supp. 704, 2 ITRD 1577
(C.I.T. 1981).
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The court held that the de minimis rule is applicable to CVD cases but that
factual questions as to the tax ceiling and the export financing remained,
requiring a further investigation. 74
Accordingly, the International Trade Administration reopened the in-
vestigation.17 5 In its final determination, the agency addressed both the tax
ceiling and the export financing issue.176
As to the preferential income tax ceiling, it was argued on behalf of
Taiwan that any benefit thereunder was not countervailable since the tax
ceiling benefit was generally available to all "productive enterprises" and
hence was not "industry specific.' 7 7 In response, the agency held that the
benefit was countervailable because "only certain categories of industry
may benefit from the maximum tax rate," namely, those that are listed in
the "categories of industries" regulations promulgated to implement Tai-
wan's Statute for Encouragement of Investment.178
As to the preferential export financing issue, the agency determined
that the preferential loan rate for raw material purchases under an export
loan program was countervailable; the amount of the subsidy was the differ-
ential between the discounted loan rate and the commercial rate. 79
The International Trade Administration determined that only Cheng
Shin received a greater than de minimis benefit under these two programs,
in a net amount of 0.893% ad valorem.'" Consequently, an order was pub-
lished to that effect.16 '
Fireplace Mesh Panels. On August 18, 1982, the International Trade
Administration initiated a CVD investigation of fireplace mesh panels from
Taiwan.162 Thus this product, similarly to bicycle tires and tubes, is subject
to both dumping and CVD investigations.183 On August 31, the ITC made
a preliminary affirmative determination,'u but stated:
Figures for January-June 1982 indicate that imports from Taiwan
declined substantially in this period compared with the corresponding
174. 2 ITRD, supra note 173, at 1578-1580.
175. 46 Fed. Reg. 39464 (1981).
176. 46 Fed. Reg. 53201 (1981).
177. 46 Fed. Reg. at 53202 (1981).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. 46 Fed. Reg. at 53203 (1981).
181. 47 Fed. Reg. 6913 (1982).
182. 47 Fed. Reg. 36005 (1982).
183. See text at note 150, supra.
184. Fireplace Mesh Panels from Taiwan, USITC Investigation No. 701-TA-185 (Pre-
liminary), USITC Pub. No. 1284 (September 1982).
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period of 1981. Similarly, the ratio of imports from Taiwan to apparent
consumption and to apparent open-market consumption have declined
significantly during this period. If this trend continues, it may well im-
pact upon the Commission's determination of material injury or threat
of material injury should a final investigation be conducted on this
matter.88
Thus a continued decline in consumption may lead to a negative final
determination. 1"
E. Unfair Competition
Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, prohibits "unfair
methods of competitive and unfair acts in the importation of articles into
the United States, . . . the effect or tendency of which is to destroy or
substantially injure an industry, efficiently and economically operated, in
the United States . . . . 18
Section 337 is generally invoked as a remedy to patent infringement by
goods imported into the United States. Cases thereunder are heard under
adjudicatory proceedings by an Administrative Law Judge of the ITC, with
a full legislative-type hearing by the Commission following the ALJ's rec-
ommended determination.'" If a patent is held valid and infringed, the
usual remedy is an exclusion order.18
Skateboards. In November 1978, the ITC found that U.S. Patent No.
3,565,454 covering kicktail skateboards was invalid for obviousness.'" The
U.S. patentee/petitioner appealed to the Court of Customs and Patent Ap-
peals (CCPA), and the court held the patent valid.1 1 On remand, the Com-
mission issued an exclusion order.1 "
Skateboards is significant in its embodiment of the standard of patent-
ability as handed down by the CCPA. The Taiwan manufacturers had ar-
gued before the CCPA that the commercial success of an alleged invention
has relevance as to validity only if the criteria of nonobviousness under 35
185. Id. at 7 (footnote deleted).
186. At the time of this writing, the preliminary International Trade Administration find-
ing was not available.
187. 19 U.S.C. §1337(a) (1976).
188. Id.; 19 C.F.R. § 12.39 (1983).
189. See, e.g., Certain Skateboards, USITC Investigation No. 337-TA-37, USITC Pub.
No. 1101 (1980).
190. Certain Skateboards, USITC Investigation No. 337-TA-37, USITC Pub. No. 926
(1978).
191. Stevenson v. ITC, 612 F.2d 546 (CCPA 1979).
192. Certain Skateboards, supra note 189.
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U.S.C. §103 do not produce a firm conclusion, i.e., only in a close case.' 93
This is, in fact, the law among the circuit courts. The CCPA, disagreeing,
held that:
The inference of obviousness drawn from prior art disclosures is only
prima facie justification for drawing the ultimate legal conclusion that
the claimed invention is obvious under 35 U.S.C. §103. Therefore it is
necessary that such secondary considerations [as commercial success]
also be evaluated in determining the final validity of that legal
conclusion.'
In other words, the secondary criteria (commercial success, long-felt but
unsatisfied need, etc.) are sharply elevated from their usual status as deter-
minants only in close cases.
The CCPA's apparent solicitude for patent holders has consequences
beyond section 337 cases in view of the recent statute1"9 vesting the
CCPA-now the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit-with national
jurisdiction over all appeals in cases where the validity or infringement of a
patent is at issue.
In July 1981, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed
a lower court decision finding U.S. Patent No. 3,565,454 to be invalid for
obviousness.'" The ITC subsequently reopened the investigation sua sponte
to determine whether the exclusion order should be set aside,19 and ulti-
mately dissolved the exclusion order.'"
Other cases. Section 337 is enjoying a vogue, and several cases have
been filed naming respondents in Taiwan, including Coin-Operated Audio-
visual Games, 199 Pump Top Insulated Containers,'" Rotary Scraping
Tools,201 Airtight Cast-Iron Stoves,' 0 ' Window Shades,' and Food
Slicers.' 4
On an individual basis, these cases have little effect on overall U.S.-
193. See 612 F.2d at 553.
194. Id.
195. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, P.L. 97-164.
196. Stevenson v. Grentec, Inc., 652 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied 50 U.S.L.W.
3854 (April 27, 1982).
197. 47 Fed. Reg. 28485 (1982).
198. 47 Fed. Reg. 39747 (1982).
199. USITC Investigation No. 337-TA-105, USITC Pub. No. 1267 (1982).
200. USITC Investigation No. 337-TA-59, USITC Pub. No. 1010 (1979).
201. USITC Investigation No. 337-TA-62, USITC Pub. No. 1027 (1980).
202. USITC Investigation No. 337-TA-69, USITC Pub. No. 1126 (1981).
203. USITC Investigation No. 337-TA-83, USITC Pub. No. 1152 (1981).
204. USITC Investigation No. 337-TA-76, USITC Pub. No. 1159 (1981).
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Taiwan trade. However, the increasing resort to section 337 ac-
tions-especially coupled with the CCPA's solicitude for patentees, dis-
cussed above-increases the likelihood that patent cases may act as a re-
straint on U.S.-Taiwan trade relations.
IV. OUTSTANDING ISSUES
The principal outstanding issue 05 in U.S.-Taiwan trade is the problem
of counterfeiting and infringement of intellectual property. The "Interna-
tional Anticounterfeiting Coalition" (IAC), based in New York and com-
posed of large American, English and other European firms, has been ap-
plying continuous pressure for changes in Taiwan's anti-counterfeiting laws.
The IAC labels Taiwan the center of the largest counterfeiting operations
in the world.
The American Institute in Taiwan reports it has received at least 41
counterfeiting complaints to date in 1982, none of which has been settled.
The AIT's 1982 Outlook, however, indicates that this issue may be moving
toward resolution: 20°
Protection of intellectual property rights, including patents, trade-
marks, and copyrights, remains a difficult and contentious issue. Tai-
wan is not a member of any international agreement on patent and
trademark protection, and is unlikely to become one. The International
Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition recently identified Taiwan as the world's
number one source of counterfeit goods. Major American consumer
goods manufacturers have serious problems with copies of their prod-
ucts bearing similar or identical trademarks. Similar trademarks are
most injurious in the Middle Eastern and African export markets
where customers are relatively unsophisticated and frequently cannot
read English. Even companies which have registered their trademarks
in Taiwan find that trying to enforce their rights is expensive, frustrat-
ing, and frequently impossible.
Many high-ranking officials are seriously concerned about the situ-
ation and are working to correct it. There can be no doubt that in re-
cent years, such administrative authorities as the Board of Foreign
Trade, the Patent Office, and the Bureau of Commodity Inspection and
Quarantine have made efforts to help trademark owners. Penalties for
205. Information in the remainder of this section was provided to the author in numerous
recent interviews with officials of the U.S. Departments of Commerce and Agriculture, the
American Institute in Taiwan and the Coordination Council for North American Affairs. The
synthesis and conclusions are the author's.
206. AIT Outlook 1982, supra note 20, at 4.
THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW JOURNAL
violations of local laws protecting patents and trademarks have been
increased, and proposals now before the Legislative Yuan would
broaden protection and further increase penalties. The current propos-
als, for instance, would close the very serious loophole denying protec-
tion to computer software and graphic design.
Nonetheless, Taiwan has a long way to go before its patent and
trademark protection meets the standards expected in the developed
world. In practice, sentences handed down for violations are very light,
and convictions of even the most flagrant violators are sometimes re-
versed on appeal. The agricultural chemicals industry is especially hard
hit by the difficulty of protecting its patents. Foreign investors some-
times cite patent protection as a reason for reluctance to bring their
best technology to Taiwan.
It is the author's understanding that the laws referred to in the AIT
Outlook quoted above have been enacted and are expected to be imple-
mented in early 1983. In addition, the IAC has apparently decided it would
undertake the funding of prosecutions under the Taiwan law.
A second problem that surfaced in part of 1982 now appears to have
been resolved. In the first eight months of 1982, there were between 10 and
20 instances where American businessmen had had their passports retained
upon entry into Taiwan. These actions, which confined the businessmen to
the island, were taken following the filing of criminal complaints by
Taiwanese exporters alleging fraud in connection with letters of credit or
business transactions. It is the author's understanding that this practice has
ceased and that orders will no longer be issued to hold passports or other-
wise interfere with business travellers in such cases.
A third problem appears to have surfaced recently in regard to Saudi
Arabian financing of a Taiwanese telecommunications project. It is the au-
thor's understanding that the Saudi financing, which is on highly favorable
terms, would require bidders to comply with information requests as to the
bidder's business dealings with Israel, as part of the Arab-boycott of Israel.
Compliance with this request would run afoul of the antiboycott provisions
of U.S. law.207 This, in turn, could have repercussions far beyond the mag-
nitude of the transactions directly involved, in spite of the fact that Taiwan
would appear to be totally devoid of any intention to support the Arab boy-
cott of Israel.
In addition to the foregoing particular problems, there are pending bi-
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lateral discussions on proposals for tariff concessions, particularly in certain
agricultural products. These issues, however, do not appear extraordinary;
indeed, they are a necessary part of strong bilateral relations.
Finally, the AIT 1982 Outlook lists several further issues and
problems which are set forth below without further comment.'"
Market Opportunities
The current recession has severely depressed Taiwan's imports
from the United States particularly of capital goods. However, some
immediate opportunities remain, and a gradual recovery starting late in
1982 should spark renewed demand for a wide range of products.
High Technology
Taiwan's electronics industry continues to show considerable
strength despite the recession. Electronics industry production and test
equipment is a good area for expanding U.S. exports. In electronics and
other high-tech areas, the authorities are seriously concerned about the
lack of research and development by Taiwan's industries. In electronics,
only 0.9% of total revenue is spent on R & D, as opposed to the five to
six percent that is common in other countries. The figure for manufac-
turing as a whole is only 0.6%. The authorities want this raised to 2.0%.
In pursuit of this goal, various incentives are offered to investors. One
of the most significant efforts has been the establishment of the "sci-
ence industry park" at Hsinchu. An independent authority has been
created that offers foreign investors who set up R & D facilities tax
holidays, expedited approvals, and other incentives.
Increased emphasis on research should further improve the already
excellent market opportunities for precision instrumentation, laboratory
testing equipment, and computers, especially systems for computer as-
sisted design.
Energy
Projections of Taiwan's energy situation have changed radically in
the last year or two. After the last oil price shock, Taiwan was being
touted as a major new market for American coal. However, the reces-
sion combined with conservation measures and a switch out of energy
intensive industries such as aluminum produced a sharp reduction in
total power consumption during 1981 and early 1982. Consequently,
Taiwan Power Company (Taipower), the largest consumer, is now sell-
ing off excess supplies of coal to other domestic users such as the ce-
ment industry. Demand for imported coal will not increase substan-
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tially in the near future. Both Taipower and China Steel believe their
coal needs are covered by existing contracts until at least 1990.
For the longer term, Taiwan continues to be interested in coal.
Port and handling facilities are being improved to handle ships of
125,000 tons and more that will be built for Taipower and China Steel.
Future coal imports will come from areas that can handle these ships.
Potential exporters should also realize that Taiwan buyers prefer to
contract with owners of coal for long-term delivery contracts. They do
not deal with brokers or buy spot coal except to make up contract
shortfalls.
Taiwan remains committed to nuclear power, despite the recently
announced two-year postponement of the seventh and eighth nuclear
plants. The postponement is the result of lower demand projections and
a desire to hold down public expenditures. Taipower still plans for nu-
clear power to provide a growing share of Taiwan's power needs.
Emphasis on energy conservation will create some export opportu-
nities. Energy-saving equipment of all kinds, particularly process con-
trols, combustion controls, and microprocessor applications, will enjoy a
growing market where the vendor can demonstrate a satisfactory short
payback period.
V. CONCLUSIONS
US-ROC trade relations appear to be little affected, if at all, by the
U.S. withdrawal of diplomatic recognition. The passage of the Taiwan Re-
lations Act appears to have satisfied the American business community as
to the U.S. commitment to Taiwan. It may be expected that the strong and
mutually beneficial U.S.-Taiwan relationship will continue, and it is to be
hoped that the United States will remain sensitive to the business commu-
nity's need for predictability and stability.
